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Summary findings
To perform well, public officials must be confident  In building on the premise that public officials'
enough about the future to be able to see a relationship  actions-and  hence their organizations' performance-
between their efforts and an eventual outcome. Their  depend on the institutional environment in which they
expectations are shaped by their institutional  find themselves, this framework avoids simplistic
environment. If the rules are not credible or are unlikely  antigovernment positions but doesn't defend poor
to be enforced, or if they expect policies to be  performance. Some public officials perform poorly and
contradicted  or resources to flow unpredictably, results  engage in rent seeking, but some selfless and determined
will be uncertain, so there is little point in working  public officials work hard under extremely difficult
purposefully.  conditions. This framework offers an approach for
Manning, Mukherjee, and Gokcekus present an  understanding both bad performance and good and for
analytical framework used to design a series of surveys of  presenting the results to policymakers in a format that
public officials' views of their institutional environment  leads to more informed choices about public sector
and to analyze the information generated in 15  reform.
countries. They describe how survey results help map a  Types of reforms discussed include strengthening the
public sector's strengths and weaknesses and offer an  credibility of rules for evaluation, for record
approach to identifying potential payoffs from reforms.  management, for training, and for recruitment; ensuring
The framework emphasizes how heterogeneous  that staff support government policy; preventing political
incentives and institutional arrangements are within the  interference or micromanagement; assuring staff that
public sector. It emphasizes how important it is for  they will be treated fairly; and making government
policymakers to base decisions on information (not  policies consistent.
generalizations) that suggests what is most likely to work,
and where.
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This paper lays down the analytical framework that was used in designing a series of
surveys of the views of public officials concerning their institutional environment and in
analyzing the information that was generated in 15 countries. It describes how the survey
results help to challenge preconceptions, map the strengths and weaknesses of a public
sector, and identify potential pay-offs from reforrn interventions.
The need for an analytical framework emerged from the lessons of past experience in the
World Bank. The Operations Evaluation Department reported that during 1980-97, only
one-third of the Bank's closed civil service reforrn interventions had successful
outcomes.'  Other reviews of the Bank's public sector reform efforts have identified
shortcomings of the Bank's approach in this area, pointing out the risks of a narrow and
'technocratic' view of what is needed for public sector reform, and of a reliance on 'best
practice' models that have not been feasible in the particular country setting.  2 The
Bank's most recent strategy for reforning public institutions has identified that for the
approach to be effective:
"...  we need to work with our partners to understand and address the broad range of
incentives and pressures - both inside and outside of government - that affect public
sector performance."' 3
The strategy paper also points out that for the analytic work to be useful:
"We need to start with a thorough understanding of what exists on the ground and
emphasize goodfit  rather than any one-size-fits-all notion of best practice. And we need
to work with our clients and other partners to develop and apply analytic tools
effectively.  "
The framework laid out in this paper addresses both these needs.  Public officials are not
inherently rapacious rent-seekers; they respond to the incentive structure they face.
There is ample evidence, both theoretical and empirical, to suggest that the performance
of public officials is greatly determined by the institutional environment that they find
themselves in.  The framework recognizes that incentive systems are different in different
countries - and vary across types of organizations and types of officials in the same
country. Recognizing this, it offers a method for designing surveys that uncover the
sanctions and rewards that drive behavior from those who may be subjected to them - the
public officials themselves.
Surveys were designed to cover several areas. They elicit a contextual description of the
public sector, including characteristics of respondents, their reasons for joining the public
sector and the length of time worked in government. Second, they offer the possibility of
I  World  Bank (1999).
2  World  Bank (2000).  http://www-wbweb.worldbank.orgfprem/prmps/
3  Ibid,  p.4-5.
1presenting policy-makers with robust confirmation of the theory-based assertion that it is
the institutional environment in general, and rule credibility, policy credibility, and
resource adequacy and predictability in particular, which drive performance. Third, they
provide an opportunity to inform in-country reform discussions with current data.
Fourth, the surveys also allow country-specific hypotheses to be tested. Many widely
held views on public officials are often repeated but without substantive evidence - more
akin to "urban myths" than to empirical observations. The surveys allow such assertions
to be tested and supported or refuted.
Finally, the surveys allow some assessment of which aspects of institutional environment
are impacting on performance. It suggests those reform actions that seem most promising
for higher performance, given the country's existing public sector conditions.
The surveys and analyses were financed under the Bank-Netherlands Partnership
Program (BNPP).  Surveys of public officials funded by the BNPP have been completed
in Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, East Caribbean States, Guyana and
Indonesia. Surveys are in progress or are being initiated in Bulgaria, Cameroon, India,
Kenya, Macedonia, and Moldova. This program has provided funds for data analysis of a
separate survey of public officials in Armenia, and another data analysis exercise is also
planned for an ongoing survey in Benin. The survey instruments were based on a model
designed in collaboration with Professor Bert Rockman of the University of Pittsburgh.
World Bank staff working on a particular country tailored this basic questionnaire
according to country-specific background and issues in public sector reform.
This paper summarizes the premises on which the surveys were designed and analyzed,
and the analytical framework.  In explaining that analytical framework, examples have
been used whenever it was considered their use would help make ideas clear. The
examples have been drawn from survey experience during 1999 and 2000, and country
data in Albania, Armenia, Bolivia, Guyana, Macedonia, and five countries in the East
Caribbean region.  The selection of examples was guided by their usefulness in
illustrating the steps in the analytical framework, and not to point out any strengths or
weaknesses of any country's public sector.
Section 2 lays out the conceptual framework. Section 3 summarizes the survey
methodology. Section 4 describes the approach for measuring the institutional
environment using the East Caribbean example as an illustration. The approach for
measuring aspects of performance is described in section 5, again using the same
example of East Caribbean states. The relationship between performance and institutional
environment is described in section 6, using the illustration of the Bolivian public sector.
The Bolivian example was also used in Section 7 to show how survey results can be used
to identify promising prospects for reform.
Section 8 concludes with an overview of how the analytical framework is being used in
practice.
22.  Conceptual Framework
Public officials in developing countries are often viewed as unskilled, poorly educated
and poorly motivated to perform their official tasks. The assumption is frequently made
that public officials are primarily motivated to exploit any official privileges that their
positions give them to engage in opportunistic behaviors. Given the poor performance of
public bureaucracies in many developing countries, and the undeniable reality of the low
public sector salaries, such an assumption may not be wholly unrealistic. Yet, there are
many public officials who, despite such a poor incentive environment, may perform their
tasks without shirking, stealing or subverting in spite of overwhelming incentives for
opportunism. For every rent-seeking or poorly motivated public official, there may be
another who is providing a valuable service under extremely adverse circumstances.
There is perhaps more to be learnt from an examination of why some public officials
perform against the odds than from reciting the standard litany of failing public services.
This paper starts from the premise that public officials' actions - and hence the
performance of their organizations - depend upon the institutional environment in which
they find themselves. In this way the analytical framework avoids the anti-government
bias that pervades much of the literature on the public sector in developing countries,
without attempting a defensive justification for poor performance. 4 The analytical model
allows verification of the assumption that it is the institutional environment that impacts
on the performance of organizations in the public sector rather than the waywardness or
malfeasance of officials. Accordingly, this model suggests that reform interventions that
improve any or all aspects of the institutional environment will result in higher
perfornance  of some or all of the areas in which performance is measured.
Figure  1.  Analytical model for BNPP-funded surveys
Institutional environment:  Performance:
*  policy credibility  i  *  results focus
*  rule credibility  *  accountability
. resource adequacy and  *  employee morale
predictability
2.1  What is meant by institutional environment? 5
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints, or set of relational contracts that guide
public officials' activities. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g. norms of behavior, conventions, codes of
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.  For public officials, formal rules are laid
4  See  Tendler  (1997)  for  a summary  of  these  perspectives.
This  section  was  developed  in collaboration  with  Yasuhiko  Matsuda  of LCSPS.
3down in their code of conduct and operation manuals, in the budget documents, and in
the many decrees, directives and instructions through which policy is conveyed. The
informal rules are what the officials collectively understand as appropriate behavior,
'how we do things around here'.  For example, not vigorously implementing the
minister's newly announced scheme might result in a transfer to a position in a remote
and inaccessible area.
Institutions provide the incentives that provoke or prohibit certain actions. Rules and
regulations, formal and informal, together define the incentive structure of public
officials within their organization, or within their peer group, or across the public sector
as a whole.6 Fundamentally then, this institutional environment shapes the expectations
of public officials.  If there is a rule about the management of records in the organization,
or about methods of performance appraisal, then behavior will vary according to whether
the official believes that breaches of these rules really will be punished.  Similarly,
willingness to gear actions to support Ministerial policies is somewhat greater if officials
believe that policies will remain in force for a period of time, and will not be undermined
by other policies of equal force. Expectations that policies are likely to be soon reversed
lead, at best, to second-guessing of what the next ones might look like. At worst they
lead to cynical disregard for any announced policy.
Theprincipal-agent perspective assumes incompatibility of interests between the
principal and the agent.!  The consequent pursuit of private interests can take various
forms including shirking (i.e., under-production of outputs desired by the principal),
stealing (i.e., embezzlement and other forms of bureaucratic corruption), and
sabotage/subversion (i.e., pursuit of objectives that are blatantly against the
organization's goals).
The relationship between the principal and the agent thus conceptualized is a contractual
one, whereby the agent agrees to perform certain tasks, which he/she would not have
done without the "contract," in exchange for a set of positive incentives to be provided by
the principal. The principal enforces the contract through the monitoring mechanisms.
In this perspective, an organization is a chain of voluntary contracts in a hierarchical
structure. 8 Suggested performance improvements emerging from this perspective tend to
refer to increases in official salaries, greater contestability in public service provision, and
stiff penalties for rule breaking. 
6  See Horn  (1995)
7  The principal-agent  theory  is not the only application  of economic  theories  to the study  of
organizations. For a more thorough  and  nuanced  treatment  of the 'new economics  of organization,'  see
Moe  (1984). For a systematic  application  of the transactions  cost approach  to explaining  structures  of
public  bureaucracies,  see Horn (1995).  More  generally,  for an application  of principal-agent  theory  to the
subject  of state reform,  see Przeworski  (1999).
8  The logic of principal-agent  relations  can be extended  beyond a particular  organizational  boundary
to include  an analysis  of the relationship  between  a bureaucratic  organization  (as represented  by its head)
and government  (i.e.,  minister)  or politicians  (i.e.,  president,  legislature). Examples  include Weingast  and
Moran (1983),  McCubbins  and Schwartz  (1984), and  McCubbins,  Noll, and Weingast  (1987, 1989).
9  See,  for example,  Klitgaard  (1997).
4While persuasive, there are some limitations to this model.  First, the economic theories
tend to focus on formal institutions (e.g., official wages, as opposed to career
possibilities, as an incentive; formal auditing, as opposed to social/peer pressure, as a
monitoring mechanism).'" Second, crude economic theories may draw our attention
disproportionately to the "minimal state" agenda with its accompanying mantra of
"reduce bureaucratic discretion".  Third, the whole rationale of the principal-agent theory
breaks down if we accept that part of the bureaucracy's functions is to protect long-term
public interests by not being fully responsive to particular short-term concerns of the
government of the day.  1 Finally, unlike profit-seeking private firms that presumably
operate with a clear ownership pattern and an unambiguous line of accountability, public
bureaucracies usually operate under supervision from multiple principals.1 2
In sum, the principal-agent perspective emphasizes:
1.  Monetary incentives;
2.  Mechanisms for monitoring contracts; and
3.  Clarity of agency mission.
Critics complain that such economic theories offer relatively little in the way of
explanations for non-opportunistic behavior in the public bureaucracy. 3 Such seemingly
selfless actions are perplexing within the principal-agent perspective.  However, the
perspective is also limited by its focus on performance that can be observed and
measured.  Some other tasks require such a high level of discretion with virtually no
possibility of effective monitoring that the principal cannot rely on economic incentives.
Other non-monetary incentives, such as identification with the agency's mission or with
the agency itself as well as esprit de corps, must be considered.
The principled-agent perspective purports to offer more empirically accurate account of
organizational dynamics and bureaucratic behavior, but at the same time its analytical
power is somewhat more limited than that of the principal-agent theories.  Leadership is
seen to be key'4, as is "a strong sense of mission, effective managerial practice, and high
expectations about employee performance".,5 The perspective builds on the sociological
traditions that have tended to see organization as an organic entity and have emphasized
'°  See Heyman  (1988)  and Miller  (1994).
3'  A large-scale  survey-based  study  of senior  bureaucrats  and politicians  in five  western countries
found  that "policymaking  by bureaucrats  is characterized  by continuity,  stability,  and predictability"  in
clear distinction  to the views  of politicians  who see themselves  as "advocates,  partisans, and  tribunes"
(Aberbach,  Putnam,  and Rockman,  1981,  p. 25  6-7).
12  See Moe (1984),  Moe (1990),  Simon  (1991),  and Fukuyama  (1995).
1  3  They are "far better at explaining  why  bureaucrats  shirk,  subvert,  or steal  than they are at
explaining  why bureaucrats  behave as 'principled  agents' - workers  who do not shirk,  subvert,  or steal  on
the job even  when  the pecuniary  and other  tangible  incentives  to refrain from these behaviors  are weak or
nonexistent"  (Dilulio,  1994,  p. 277). Herbert  Simon  also  provides  a critique  of the principal-agent  variant
labeled  transactions  cost analysis  (Simon  1991).
14  Dilulio (1994).  Other  influential  organization  theorists  including  Selznick  (1957) and Wilson
(1989)  have also  underscored  critical  roles of leadership  in accounting  for organizational  performance.
IS  See Grindle  (1997, p.491).
5culture, leadership, and styles of authority and power'6, and that emphasize the limitations
of formal  contracts.  17
There is a sizeable literature that sees officials' identification with organizational
objectives as key to their "principled" behaviors. Another source of motivation is public
officials' long-term career paths.  When bureaucratic career paths are fairly well defined
and predictable, they induce a particular range of behaviors from public officials who are
interested in improving their career prospects. Recruitment and promotion processes
work as socialization mechanisms that selectively preserve particular types of
individuals.' 8
One key to performance within the principled-agent perspective is that career paths are
long term, allowing reputational rewards to be developed.'9
Thus the principled-agent perspective emphasizes:
1.  Clarity of agency mission;
2.  Organizational culture and trust; and
3.  Long-term career paths.
Some political scientists see public sector organizations, not exclusively in developing
countries, as webs of patron-client networks. 20 This perspective observes the patron-
client relationship as based more on trust and loyalty than short-term, transaction-specific
utility-maximizing calculation and bargaining by both parties.
Unlike a typical principal-agent relationship marked by incentive incompatibility
between the two actors, a patron-client relationship is based on the recognition of mutual
(albeit unequal) benefits that the two actors derive from the relationship. Furthermore, to
the extent that incentive incompatibility threatens the possibility of mutual gains, the
personal and long-term nature of the relationship between the patron and the client
reduces the monitoring costs of the client's behavior, and thus mnitigates  the agency
problems.  The client is bound by the sense of loyalty and obligation as well as motivated
by the expectation of present and future benefits from the continued participation in the
relationship.
16  See  Weber  (1946),  Selznick  (1957),  and  Simon  (1974).
17  An  interesting  point  is that  Williamson's  (1975)  seminal  study  of  the economics  of organization
finds the superiority  of internal  organizations  (hierarchies)  over  markets  because  of the former's greater
ability  to control  opportunism.
18  Aberbach,  Putnam,  and Rockman  (1981)  provide  an example  of this impact  on a range of attitudes
and behaviors  observed  among  bureaucrats  at senior  levels,  and Schneider  (1993)  provides  an example  of
the reverse.
19  OECD  (1  994a) also  notes that in some countries  "the official  doctrine  is that  public servants
receive  a means of subsistence  to enable  them  to serve the state". The strongest  expression  of this particular
incentive  logic is to be found  in the German  pay policy  for established  civil  servants,  Beamte. For this
group,  traditionally,  pay "is  not  regarded  as  remuneration  for  work  performed  or for  performance  of
function,  but as a means of livelihood  linked  to office. (The  remuneration)  is intended  to enable  Beamte,  to
give full commitment  to duty of service  to state and  to live at appropriate  standard  for service  rank and (to)
be independent".
20  See Dresang  (1974), and Schneider  (1991).
6This perspective assumes that it is more than likely that the loyalty to the patron will
overwhelm the client's identification with the organizational objectives. This militates
against effective organizational performance if the patron utilizes employment
opportunities in the public sector as a means to reward political supporters. This
perspective also requires that career paths are long term, although in this case the reason
is that the currency of jobs in which the patron rewards the client holds little value if jobs
can be withdrawn at any moment.
Patron-client relations require extensive informality. Comprehensive, formal rules with
clear policy objectives and restraints on the ability of the principal to micro-manage
would remove the ability of the patron to reap the rewards from having placed their
clients in key positions.
The patron-client perspective emphasizes:
1.  Long term career paths; and
2.  Informality.
2.2  How can institutional environment be measured?
These perspectives emphasize different sets of arrangements and consequently they direct
attention to different potential levers for improving performance. Whatever perspective
is adopted on the motivation of public officials, three particular sets of concerns stand out
as fundamnental  - the nature of the rules that constrain the behavior of public officials, the
nature of the policies that they are asked to implement, and the manner in which they are
provided with resources. As shown in Figure 2, these are always the ingredients in the
incentive mix, whatever the assumed recipe. 21 Within these dimensions, the institutional
environment shapes expectations of future constraints and incentives. An official, who
has come to expect that rules will not be enforced, works in an environment of low rule
credibility. His or her behavior is shaped by the expectation that the rules for personnel
and budget management will not be enforced in the future.  22
The three dimensions of the institutional environment  - rule credibility; policy
credibility; and resource adequacy and predictability - represent measures of the
expectations of public officials concerning the future.
21  See Manning  and  James (2000)  for a discussion  of credible  regulation  within  the public  sector.
See Evans  and Manning  (2000)  for a discussion  of policy  credibility.
22  This  point  that institutional  arrangements  impact  individuals'  actions  in the present  by shaping
their expectations  about  the future  is made extensively  in the institutional  literature. See,  for example,
Bendor  and  Mooklierjee  (1987)  and Mnookin  and  Kornhauser  (1989). It is consistent  with an assertion  that
the problem  facing  both  public  and  private  sector  managers  is one of maintaining  their collective  reputation
as a relevant  actor  among  their staff  (See Seabriglt 1993). More  generally,  the literature  on cooperation  in
the absence  of third-party  enforcement  emphasizes  that "the shadow  of the future"  (i.e.,  the degree  to which
actors  expect  to interact  again  under similar  circumstances)  significantly  determines  behavior  in the present
(See  Axelrod  and Keohane,  1985).
7Figure  2.  Credible  rules,  credible  policy and predictable  resourcing  constitute
the institutional  environment  within  any perspective
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Against this context, the study has adopted a framnework  for measuing  the institutional
environment built around measurement of these three factors that constitute the
institutional environment. Accordingly, indicators are constructed to measure how much
rule credibility, policy credibility and resource adequacy and predictability the
institutional arrangements are providing.
2.3  How can perfiormance  be measured?
In addition to the well-recognized  difficulties  in assessing  organizational  performance,
quantifying performnance  of public organizations  runs into two main problems.  23  First,
unlike private organizations, public organizations have no single performance indicator
that can compare across different types of organization and products, such as profits
earned or market share. In the public sector, only a few organizations work for profit.
23  Acs  and  Gerlowski  (1996)  list  the  classic  difficulties  including  measurement  errors,  random
effects,  and factors  outside  the control  of the organization.  Carter,  Klein,  and Day (1995)  lists  ownership,
trading/non-trading,  competition,  accountability,  heterogeneity,  complexity,  and  uncertainty  as the
organizational  dimensions  and argue  that  these  dimensions  show  huge variation  among  public
organizations.  They also point out the difficulty in measuring the quality of service delivery.
8Outputs of many organizations such as the audit body or the planning division of the
Ministry of Finance are used only by other organizations within the public sector.
Second, public sector organizations are often dealing in goods of both low contestability
and measurability. 24 In such circumstances it is generally impossible to find performance
measures of the public sector that satisfy the ideal qualities of consistency, comparability,
clarity, controllability, comprehensiveness, boundedness, relevance, and feasibility. 25
For instance, when public agencies' perfornance  is measured, the metrics are distinctly
organization or service-specific. The waiting time for a patient to see a doctor is not
readily compared to performance in primary school enrolment. The current extensive
debate on performance in the public sector provides illustrations of benchmarks that can
be applied over time, but has done little to solve the problem of comparability between
diverse agencies and sectors. 26
Nevertheless, performance needs to be measured. The analytical framework described in
the following pages introduces a new approach to measure performance of public
organizations. In particular, it suggests that there are some common assertions that lie
behind currently used diverse measures of performance. In particular it identifies three
dimensions that are key to any conceptualization of performance: how focused officials
have been on results, their accountability for adherence to formal rules, and their
morale. 27
Results focus is prima facie evidence that public officials are striving to achieve
organizational goals and clearly lies behind consideration of organizational efficiency and
effectiveness. It is a reasonable, although empirically testable, proposition that rewarding
good performance and punishing bad performance encourages a results focus.
Accountability is perforrnance in the distinctive sense of having adhered to the formal
rules and so enabling actual behavior to be tested against mandated standards. For public
sector organizations, which work with public funds, accountability is an important
element of performance. Corruption is a symptom of poor accountability performance -
but the notion of accountability adopted for this study is wider than corruption.28
Accountability in this sense rests on the past enforcement of regulations.  This measure is
of course different from an assessment of the existence of credible and appropriate rules
and regulations, which is an aspect of the institutional environment. This notion of
accountability includes transparency in decision-making and allocation of government
resources. This refers, for example, not only to the audit of public accounts and making
24  See Girishankar  (1999).
25  See Shand  (1997).
26  See for example  OECD  (1994b),  Public Service  and Merit Protection  Commission,  Australia
(1998),  Gore (1993)  and Osborne  and Plastrik  (1997).
27  A study  by the authors  of this paper is in progress  to empirically  examine  the link between  these
performance  measures  and conventional  output and outcome  indicators,  and its findings  will be available  in
2000.
2S  See  World Bank (1998).
9the audit report available to legislature, but also to a history of regular consultations with
the private sector, citizens' groups and NGOs.
Finally, employee morale is also identified as a component of organizational
performance. This is both a performance goal in its own right, and a contributor to
organizational effectiveness and efficiency as identified in Australian and Canadian
studies of public employees of the 1980s. 29 Employee morale is raised by job satisfaction
and reduced by the orientational and attitudinal disconnect that managers have with their
staff. 30 This latter concept of a disconnect between the managers of organizations and
other officials working in them has been usefuilly  termed 'vertical solitude'. 31 It is the
orientational and attitudinal disconnect that managers have with officials below them. As
managers rise in the hierarchy, two factors cause them to become "impersonal." First,
they become increasingly aware that they are no longer managing front-line staff, but
other people who think like them. Therefore, their thought patterns and worldview
increasingly diverge from that of their staff Second, as they rise, the units they manage
become larger until it becomes impossible to personally know everyone who works for
them. 32 As a result, communication between the managers and general officials in an
organization deteriorates. The general officials are in more regular contact with the public
and client groups, but do not clearly understand the expectations of their ministers and
manager who set the tone and direction in their departments.  33
It should be emphasized that these are intermediate measures of performance.  Given the
heterogeneity of organizational outputs it is only at this intermediate level that measures
can be found that contribute to how effectively those heterogeneous outputs are produced
in different organizations, but which are homogenous enough to permit measurement and
comparability across disparate public agencies.  The key feature of these measures of
performance is that they refer to perceptions of past events. While the institutional
environment shapes expectations of the future, performance refers to past behavior.
The conceptual framework described above proposes that performance is a function of
the institutional environment. To test this, indicators were constructed that allow
measurement of the degree of results focus, accountability and employee morale.  It thus
becomes a testable proposition that performance improves as the institutional
environment improves."
29  See Jans and Frazer-Jans (1989) and Zussman and Jabes (1989).
30  See also Schein (1996).
31  See Zussman and Jabes (1989).
32  Schein (1996).
33  Zussman, and Jabes (1989).
34  Leadership as a determinant of organizational performance has been considered in a 1999 study of
US Federal Executives (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000) and a  1987 study of the Canadian federal public
service (Zussman and Jabes 1989).
102.4  Whose  performance? - different units of analysis
In addressing the key question about whose performance we are interested in, this
analysis slices the public sector in three related ways. First, it examines some
performance questions at the whole of government level.  Second, it examines what
needs to be done to get a particular group of officials to perform more effectively. Third,
it asks what can be done to improve the performance of some particular agencies or
organizations within the public sector.  Disaggregating the public sector by type of
official and by type of agency is a pragmatic judgment, and ultimately in this and the
country reports the determination was made largely on the basis of custom and practice -
how comrnentators refer to units or groups within government in this setting.
However, it is worth exploring briefly the challenges that lie behind this simple
classification exercise.
Groups of officials
The terms 'public sector employees' and 'civil service' are often used to describe anyone
who is paid by government. However, this is a very heterogeneous group and in reality
comprises: an inner core of administrators; members of the armed forces; officials
employed by productive enterprises that are majority-owned, directly or indirectly, by the
state; health workers of any level of government; primary, secondary, or university
teachers paid by government; employees of sub-national governments, etc.
Figure  3  The main components of government employment 35
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35  For ffirther  details  see Cross-National  Data on Governument Employment  and Wages,  on the  World
Bank  Administrative  and  Civil  Service  Reformi  web  site  at
http://wwwl.worldbank.org/publicsector/test/civilservice/cross.htm.  See  also  Stevens  (1994).
11The surveys seek a country-specific approach to distinguishing between groups of
officials.  In the case of Bolivia, for example, officials from central administrations,
decentralized institutions, regional administrations were surveyed and the analysis
distinguished between consultants and other public officials. In Bangladesh, the analysis
distinguished between officials of ministries, autonomous corporations and district-level
officials. In the East Caribbean states, perceptions of managers, middle-level officials and
general officials were differentiated.
Types of agency
The characteristics of the goods that the agency produces, or the features of its tasks, are
likely to have important effects on the way public officials behave.  Some tasks naturally
involve a greater level of discretion by front-line officials, while others are more
amenable to strict standard operating procedures. Wilson (1989) has developed a
typology of agencies according to varying characteristics along two dimensions: whether
agency outputs are observable or not, and whether agency outcomes are observable or
not.  Agency outputs may not be observable simply because the agency's bureaucratic
operators conduct their duties out of view of the manager (e.g., police officers on the
beat, teachers in classrooms).  They may also be "unobservable" because what the
operators do is esoteric (e.g., a professor developing a hypothesis in a shower).
In more formal terms, four broad categories of agency can be identified.
Ministries are in a legal or constitutional sense indistinguishable from the state as they
often have no specific primary legislative basis and their assets are the general property
of the state.  Their functions and objectives are multi-purpose complex tasks and
traditionally defined by legislation (Continental European traditions) or determined
incrementally by Cabinet (UK and other Anglophone traditions).  Their source of funding
is almost entirely the state budget and they usually have nil or very minor revenue
earnings. As they have no corporate or legal identity separate from the state, they have
generally no legal competence to enter into corporate contractual relationships with
suppliers.
The term autonomous agencies can be quite confusing because it may refer to two very
different things: "executing agencies" and "statutory commissions and independent
regulators".  Executing agencies reporting to Ministries (or reporting to Ministers but
under day to day supervision of a Ministry) are often in the same legal or constitutional
sense indistinguishable from the state. However, the relevant Minister generally defines
their objectives, perhaps in framework agreement, and their source of funding can include
some revenue earnings. They rarely have legal competence to enter into contractual
relationships with suppliers.
12Some agencies are statutory commissions in that they do have a separate legislative
existence. They can be non-asset  owning  (legally  distinct  but not able  to own  assets in
any sense)  or asset owning  (legally  distinct  and the owner  of its assets). Their objectives
are often  enshrined  in a charter  and their functions  are defined  by the legislation,
including  the Minister's  powers  of direction. They can often  be budget  dependent
(subvented)  with significant  revenue  earnings. They can have legal competence  to enter
into contractual  relationships. Such  bodies  tend to be established  for regulatory  purposes,
although  in some  presidential  systems  they can also  be service  providing.
Trading  bodies also have a separate  legislative  existence,  and can be established  under
commercial  law in which  case their charter  and their articles  of association  define
functions. They  can be budget  dependent,  subsidized,  but with significant  revenue
earnings. They generally  have full legal competence  to enter  into contractual
relationships  - they can assume  corporate  liability  and can be sued.
In the present  series  of BNPP surveys,  those  in Bangladesh,  Bolivia,  East Caribbean  and
Guyana  covered  officials  from  the first three types  of organizations.
133.  Survey methodology
The surveys were designed to elicit the perceptions of public sector officials. All
employees employed in the organizations being surveyed were eligible and no control
group was included. As no 'before and after' information was sought, a cross sectional
design was selected.
3.1  Questionnaire design 36
In drafting and pre-testing the questionnaires, care was taken to avoid: ambiguous words
and phrases; questions asking two or more opinions simultaneously; words or phrases
that could be expected to trigger off emotional responses; and information that could
manipulate the respondent. 37 Most pre-testing exercises pointed to excessive length of the
questionnaires. The rule of thumb applied was that it would be unlikely that a public
official could afford to spend longer than 45 minutes with an interviewer even assuming
that the surveyor could hold the official's attention for longer.
Although the responses had to be converted to numbers for analysis, verbal response
scales were selected over numeric scales in most questionnaires. This happened because
during pre-testing, responses on a numerical scale tended to show responses clustered
close to the middle of the scale. 38 The advantage of using descriptive words for each
category of response was that each category could be relatively well defined. The number
of categories was kept low, to avoid loss of meaning in translation. The middle category
was excluded to force respondents to express preferences even when they are indifferent.
Pre-testing showed that including a middle category biased responses towards the middle
category even when respondents had a slight preference one way or other. 'Don't know'
as a response category did not appear in any survey questionnaire except in Indonesia.
Thus the number of respondents expressing an opinion was biased upwards.
Filters and branches were used. Although filter questions added to the length of the
questionnaire, they were used to ask whether or not something was a problem before
asking the degree of the problem. Most questionnaires began with 'easy'  questions like
how long the respondent had been working with government or in the same position, or
details about the personnel management system in place in the respondent's  organization.
Questions on the same theme were grouped together. Listing all categories in the same
order minimized any existing order effect within questions. In most questions categories
were listed from low to high, and from bad to good.
Most surveys asked about corruption and other sensitive questions such as what an
official did when he or she did not agree with a supervisor's decision. Recognizing that
respondents could be unwilling to admit incriminating behavior in face-to-face
36  The survey  instruments  are available  on
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/publicsector/test/civilservice/survey.htm.
3'  /  See Rea and Parker  (1997).
38  See Recantini,  Wallsten,  and Xu (2000).
14interviews, the first few surveys introduced a self-administered component (containing
sensitive questions) besides the main in-person interview. However, this method ran into
logistical problems at the data entry stage. In the later surveys, sensitive questions were
asked towards the end of the interview by which time greater rapport would have
developed between the surveyor and respondent. Even if this made the respondent
suspicious in any way or unwilling to answer further questions, it did not bias the whole
interview.
Some less direct questions were asked, such as "How serious is corruption in your
organization?" instead of the more direct "What percent of officials in your organization
take bribes?" Interestingly, in all surveys analyzed so far, officials admitted that their.
own organization was corrupt, but less corrupt than the rest of government.
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3.2  Sampling methodology
Probability sampling was the method employed in Bangladesh, Bolivia and Guyana.
Stratified random sampling was utilized with the strata being the types of organizations
described in Section 2.4.3  In East Caribbean countries, quota sampling was the method
chosen because the number of employees at each level was known accurately from the
1999 budget estimates available for these countries. 40 Focus groups were mostly utilized
to pretest draft questionnaires.
39  However,  in Bolivia,  the strata  employed  were not the types of organizations  but the hierarchical
levels  in each organization.  The  number  of different  types  of organizations  chosen  was "purposive"  to
maintain  some  representativeness,  and  to ensure  that certain  agencies  were included.
40  Fink (1995).
15Sample  sizes in different  countries  had to be determined  within  the constraints  of cost,
time and the number  of officials  willing  and available  for interviews.  Samples  varied  in
size from 62 in St. Kitts and Nevis (population  41,000;  size of  public sector 3,000)  to 823
in Bangladesh  (population  126  million;  size of public  sector  more than 100,000).  In
determining  sample  size, the number  of subgroups  to be included,  and a 0.05 level of
significance  of the null hypothesis  for the mean of the population,  were both kept  in
mind. The sampling  unit was the individual  official,  while the unit of analysis  was an
organization.  In the case of East Caribbean  countries,  the unit of analysis  was the whole
public  sector.
The response  rate in the data sets  received  thus far  was between  80% and 100%.  There
was some  item non-response  in several  countries.  For example,  item non-responses  were
50%  in Bangladesh  when officials  were asked  what they did  when they  disagreed  with
the opinions  of their supervisors.
164.  Construction of Indicators for Institutional Environment
The survey findings provide an opportunity to enrich the factual basis of national debates
on public sector reform, and to support or refute prior assertions and hypotheses in the
light of the available data. Some other uses of the data require that indicators of the
institutional environment and performance be constructed.
As explained in Section 2 outlining the conceptual framework, the institutional
environment was measured by considering officials' expectations of the incentives and
constraints that would apply in the future in terms of rule credibility, policy credibility
and resource adequacy and predictability. Indicators were constructed with rule
credibility, policy credibility and resource adequacy and predictability measured in terms
of these indicators on scales that ranged from 0 to 10, with 0 being the worst and 10
being the best.  Questions addressed both personnel and expenditure management.
The figure below shows how responses to questions were grouped in constructing the
institutional environment indicators in East Caribbean countries. 4"
Figure  5. Construction of indicators for institutional environment in East
Caribbean states
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41  In the East Caribbean states, public officials were surveyed in Antigua & Barbuda, Grenadines, St.
Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent & Grenadines. The same questionnaire was administered in all
these countries.  In all settings, the rules for allocating questions were:
Does this question capture expectations of current or future constraints and incentives?  If not, then it is not
suitable for inclusion in an indicator of the institutional enviromnent. If it does, then does the question
capture expectations of: (i) rule enforcement in relation to budget or personnel management; (ii) binding
policy direction; or (iii) adequacy and predictability of financial and personnel resources?
17Relevant and related questions were grouped under the same category as shown in the
above figure. Since the responses were all on a verbal scale, they were converted to the
same numerical scale. For uniformity, qualitative responses from all questions were
converted into numbers on the scale of 0 to 10. For example, yes/no questions were
converted into "O"  and "10".  For questions with four qualitative responses such as
always (1), generally (2), occasionally (3), almost never or never (4), the following
formula was used for the conversion: 42
Scaled response = 40/3 - (Un-scaled response)* 10/3
After the conversion, the following steps were taken to calculate rule credibility, policy
credibility, resource adequacy and predictability, and eventually the institutional
43 environment indicators.
First, the simple arithmetic average of all responses regarding the same specific aspect of
the institutional environment (i.e. average of all questions in the same box in Figure 5
above) were calculated. Second, after converting responses into numbers on a 0-10 scale
measures of policy consistency, policy coordination, and political micro-management
were derived by taking the simple average of the aspects of the institutional environment
under the same component.  Finally, the institutional environment indicator for the whole
public sector was derived as a simple arithmetic average of the three components of the
institutional environment.
In more detail, in the East Caribbean example shown in Figure  5, rule credibility was
measured by creating an indicator covering the existence and perceived quality of formal
rules in four areas: record management, internal audit, performance appraisal, and project
evaluation.'  Six questions from the survey were utilized. Questions used in that and other
surveys to probe for the dimensions of the institutional environment are set out in
Appendix  1.  Appendix 2 shows how the environment indicators were constructed for
the East Caribbean states.
42  For consistency,  always  the positive,  e.g.,  useful,  helpful,  working,  responses  were converted  to
"10," and  negative,  e.g.,  not useful,  not helpful,  not-working,  responses  were converted  into "O". For
example, in the question  "Are  job openings  advertised?" "Yes"  was converted  into "10," and "No" was
converted  into "O." Similarly,  in the question "How consistent  are the various  policies your organization?'
"Very  consistent"  was converted  into "10"; "more  consistent  than consistent" into "6.7"; "more
inconsistent  than consistent"  into "3.3"; and "very  inconsistent"  into "O".
43  Aggregating  data for indicators  entails  a delicate  tradeoff. All data sets  on public official
perceptions  are unreliable  individually  to some  degree  - and  by aggregating  several subjective  measures
from  various sources,  we can reduce this  measurement  error somewhat. However,  the gain in reliability
from aggregation  comes at the expense  of a loss in conceptual  precision. In other  words,  the tradeoff  is
between  emphasizing  individual  data sets  that may have inaccuracies,  and aggregating  them to gain
accuracy  but with the risk  that they become  more  blunt. This  paper seeks  to balance  the risks involved  by
aggregating  the data within  indicators  at this point,  but subsequently  to use  the disaggregated  data, albeit
cautiously,  in considering  potential  reform  payoffs  (see section  7.4) The risks of aggregation  are in any
case less severe  in this approach  as it entails  using  data from different  questions  but within  the same  survey.
44  Later surveys  are emphasizing  the degree  to which  the rules are structured  to require
contestability.
18Policy credibility was measured by creating an indicator covering three dimensions:
whether policies were consistent; whether they are coordinated between the units of
government e.g. ministries; and whether political interference/micro- management was
felt likely. Responses from six questions were used to calculate the policy credibility
indicator as described in Appendix 2.
Resource adequacy and predictability was measured by creating an indicator
compounded from six questions about: unpredictable seasonal absences of personnel due
to severe weather conditions e.g. hurricane; anticipated supply of necessary skills; and
about more general anticipated capacity. Appendix 2 provides details.
Using a similar method, an overall institutional environment indicator was also
constructed on a scale of 0 to 10 (O  = worst, 10 = best) by taking the simple arithmetic
mean of the rule credibility, policy credibility and resource adequacy and predictability
indicators.  In this way, as Appendix 2 illustrates, an overall institutional environment
indicator was calculated for the entire public sector of each of the East Caribbean states.
Using this approach, it is possible to measure rule credibility, policy credibility or
resource adequacy and predictability of a particular organization (e.g. Finance Ministry)
or by types of organizations (e.g. regional administrations) when sufficient data is
available for each type of organization. This was possible in the Argentina, Bolivia,
Guyana and Indonesia data sets, and such calculations were made.
195.  Construction  of Indicators  for Performance
Performance was measured in terms of results focus, accountability and employee morale
by asking public officials questions that probed their perceptions of these dimensions of
performance. To measure how much results focus, accountability and employee morale,
relevant indicators were constructed with scales which ranged from 0 to 10 - with 0
being the worst and 10 being the best. 45 As with the institutional environment indicators,
the performance indicators drew on considerations of both personnel management and
expenditure management. Although combined within the indicator, they permit
disaggregated analyses to be undertaken subsequently.
Figure 6.  Construction  of indicators  for performance  in East Caribbean  states
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In the East Caribbean, the degree of results-focus  was measured by creating an indicator
cpvering:  whether an organizanjob'satisatio.es  were geared to its objectives; whether the
organization was considered efficient; and whether a merit-based reward and punishment
system was in place. Seven questions were utilized. Questions used in that and other
45  In all settings,  the rules for allocating  questions  were:
Does  this question  capture  perceptions  of past performance?  If not, then it is not suitable  for inclusion  in
an indicator  of performance. If it does,  then does the question  capture  perceptions  of: (i) the degree  to
which  a concern  for  results or outputs  shaped  behavior;  (ii) rule-based  behavior  in relation  to budget  or
personnel  management;  (iii)  morale  and  job satisfaction.  In addition,  a measure  of vertical  solitude  was
constructed  from  the differences  in perceptions  concerning  the environment  between  managers  and their
staff?
20surveys  to probe  for the dimensions  of performance  are set out in Appendix  3.  Appendix
4 shows  how  the performance  indicators  were constructed  for the East Caribbean  states.
Accountability  was measured  by using 15 questions  to create an indicator  covering,  inter
alia, enforcement  of regulations; demonstrated  accountability  to the public at large, and
to civil society  and parliament. In assessing  the institutional  environment,  the existence
of credible  rules was tested in four areas:  record  management,  project evaluation,  internal
audit and performance  appraisal. In measuring  performance,  the past enforcement  of
these  rules was tested in the same  four areas.
Appendix  4 shows  how the performance  indicators,  including  that for accountability,.
were constructed  for the East Caribbean  states.
Employee  morale  was measured  by creating  an indicator  covering  employee  satisfaction
and vertical  solitude. Four questions  were used to calculate  satisfaction  indicator  as
shown  in Appendix  4.
Vertical  solitude  was defined  in Section  2.3 above.  The indicator  for vertical  solitude  was
calculated  by first scoring  managers'  perception  of each aspect  of the institutional
environment  and then  the general officials'  perceptions  of the same. Then,  the (absolute
value)  difference  of these scores  in each  aspect  was averaged  to yield an indicator  of
vertical  solitude. 46
The overall  performance  indicator  was calculated  by taking  the simple  arithmetic  mean of
the results-focus,  accountability,  and employee  morale.
46  This  formula  was adopted  from suggestions  by Jeff Rinne  of PRMPS.
216.  The Connection  between  Performance  and Institutional  Environment
To describe and quantify the relationship between performance and institutional
environment, a simple model was used.  Aggregate performance and its three
components, i.e., results focus, accountability for formal rules, and employee morale
were regressed on institutional environment. Accordingly, performance, Yi,  was modeled
as a function of institutional environment (EO),  and an error term ei 47:
Y=  a + b  Ei + ei
On current assumptions, for the Bolivian public sector there is a statistically significant
positive relationship between institutional environment and performance indicators.  The
estimation result for Bolivia was the following: 48
Aggregate Performance  =  0.47  +  0.74 (Institutional Environment)
t-value = 5.54
R 2 = 0.70
Number of observations =  15
Figure  7 is the result of cross-tabulation of institutional environment and aggregate
performance indicators for 15 different public organizations in Bolivia. It shows the
relationship between performance and institutional environment. Similarly, the effect of
institutional environment on each performance area was tested. Strong relations existed
between the institutional environment and each area of performance. The associated
charts are provided in Appendix 5.
47  An  error  term  was  attached  to capture  measurement  errors,  random  variations,  as well  as other
determinants  that  have been omitted  from the equation.
48  It is important  to note that the aggregation  of questions  to construct  the indicators  is a question  of
judgment,  although  simple and explicit  rules are used to minimize  variations. These  results  may change  as
the country  papers  are prepared  if the grouping  of questions  is altered.
22Thus there is empirical evidence that:
*  Institutions  do indeed matter;
49 and
*  Some performance areas are more susceptible to the institutional environment than
others ."
Figure  7.  Performance and Institutional Environment in sampled Bolivian
public sector organizations
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49  This assertion  was based on differences  in the estimated  coefficients, i.e., slope, and in goodness-
of-fit  measures,  i.  e. R2,  for the relationships between institutional enviromment and three different
components  of performance-which  are presented  in Appendix  5.
50  This same relationship is being tested using data sets from the public sectors of Armenia, Bolivia,
East Caribbean states, and Guyana. Results of these tests will provide more empirical evidence.
237.  Presenting Opportunities for Reforms
To offer some options for consideration by policy-makers, four steps were taken as
described below.  The first step emphasizes the importance of presenting policy-makers
with robust confirmation of the theory-based assertion that it is the institutional
environment in general, and rule credibility, policy credibility, and resource adequacy
and predictability in particular, which drive performance.
Having made this point and having attracted attention to the question of how and when
that environment can be changed, the second step is to maximize access to the data to
encourage policy-makers and advisers to contest possible interpretations and to suggest
locally appropriate reform interventions. The contextual description of the public sector,
including characteristics of respondents, their reasons for joining the public sector and the
length of time worked in govemment, enrich the factual basis of these discussions.
The third step is to examine any prior assertions and topical reforms in light of the
available data. In testing country-specific hypotheses, myths that have been consolidated
through repetition rather than observation can be supported with evidence or refuted.
Finally, where feasible, as an encouragement to further debate, a particular heuristic
approach is employed to move beyond theory into an empirical investigation of which
institutions matter in particular and where might the largest "performance pay offs" be
found.
7.1  Step 1 - it's the institutions not the  people
In all settings where the surveys have been undertaken, a summary country report sets out
the evidence that supports the theory-based assertion that it is the institutional
environment in general, and rule credibility, policy credibility, and resource adequacy
and predictability in particular, which drive performance.
In making this point, the intention is to deter simplistic denigration of government or
public officials.  Although there is every reason to be concerned about poor performance
and rent-seeking by some public officials, there are as many reasons to be impressed by
the selflessness and determination of others working under conditions of extreme
difficulty.  Setting out the evidence offers an approach for understanding both good and
bad performance and for presenting the results to policy makers in a format that lead to
more informed choices about reform interventions.
24Figure 8.  Rule complexity  affects  performance  in Albania
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complexity of rules
In Figure  8 the horizontal axis shows the perception of officials of the complexity of
budget management and personnel management rules in their respective administration
(local governments, central institutions, regional administrations, judicial bodies and the
control branch).  The vertical axis shows the perception of these same officials on the
enforceability of these rules.  Both complexity and enforceability of rules have been
ranked on a scale 0 to 10 with 0 being the worst possible, and 10 being the best possible. 5
7.2  Step 2 - encourage  contestation  in interpretation
The country reports also provide a summary of the descriptive data, presented in a format
that facilitates comparisons between countries. In parallel, appropriately anonymized
survey data is being placed on Internet sites.  Open discussion fora are being facilitated to
encourage policy makers, academics and other commentators to test alternative
interpretations of the findings, to contest possible interpretations and to suggest locally
appropriate reform interventions.
7.3  Step  3 - challenge  prior  assumptions
The country reports then examine any prior assumptions or topical reforms already under
consideration in the light of the available data. These prior assumptions have been
derived from country dialogue with government officials and business and civil society
representatives.  They tend to fall into two categories. Some are assertions of facts (e.g.
most civil servants would rather work in the private sector if there were jobs available)
51  Acknowledgments are due to Monica Das Gupta of the World Development Report 2000 who
contributed to this figure.
25and some are assertions of causal relationships (e.g. the way in which they were recruited
affects the degree to which officials support government policy).  Table 1 offers some
examples of the assertions tested.
Table 1  Illustrative prior assertions tested against survey evidence
country  factual assertion  assertion of causal relationship
Albania  there is wide variation in  performance is particularly highly
understanding of the proposed civil  correlated with officials' support
service law  for government policy
Eastern  managers feel that they have  unpredictable availability of
Caribbean  inadequate autonomy in budgetary  personnel as a result of natural
matters  disasters is damaging to
performance
records management systems are  performance is undermined by the
unreliable  lack of incentives linked to the
attainment of agency objectives
there is intense resistance to  donor funds for technical
regional initiatives  assistance lead to lack of incentives
and hence to poor performance
Public Accounts Committees are  automatic renewal of contracts
not considered strong  results in poor accountability for
performance
Bolivia  the SAFCO law is not considered  political patronage and interference
by officials to have improved  in day-to-day activities undermines
accountability  performance
The factual assertions are supported or refuted by simple reference to the data.  Some
assertions of a causal relationship are sufficiently precise to allow simple testing by
reference to the data.  Other such assertions, particularly those that suggest that
performance is in some general sense undermined by some aspect of the environment,
require that some indicators of performance be drawn from the conceptual model set out
in section 2.
7.4  Step 4 - encourage informed speculation on perfornance pay-offs
Where feasible, as an encouragement to further debate, a particular heuristic approach is
employed to move beyond theory into an empirical investigation of which institutions
matter particularly and where might the largest "performance pay offs" be found. The
intention of this final step is to move beyond the general finding that institutions matter
for performance, and to open up consideration of which institutions matter particularly.
In making this step, three key points should be borne in mind. First, given potential
problems of data quality, there is a risk of drawing over-elaborate conclusions that have a
veneer of statistical robustness but are unlikely to be replicable.  Second, at the general
26level, interpretation of the survey data is strongly guided by theory.  As section 2
indicates, theory gives us every reason to believe that institutions affect performance and
that rule credibility, policy credibility, and resource adequacy and predictability are
strongly implicated. However, theory provides no guidance on which of these
institutional arrangements matter most and the findings at this disaggregated level are
purely empirical. Finally, the model that has been developed is plausible but only one
from very many that could have been constructed. In the country studies that offer
detailed results, the model is only used to develop one set of interpretations where
dialogue with government and World Bank operational staff suggest that this is useful.
The key stages in making an informed speculation on performance pay-offs are as
follows:
Stage 1 -Develop an appropriate model
Model I
Performance = f (Institutional Environment).
This model has already been estimated in the previous section. It showed that predicted
correlations are high when simple averages of the elements of institutional environment is
regressed against aggregate performance as well as its three main components.
However, this information by itself is not enough for decision-makers in governments.
They already know that performance is sometimes low because of weaknesses in the
institutional environment; and if they could improve the whole institutional environment,
the overall performance would improve. They need more precision.  The logical next step
is to move from Model I towards one in which the institutional environment is
disaggregated into its components.
Model II
Performance = g (Rule Credibility, Policy Credibility, Resource Adequacy and
Predictability).
Estimating Model II will also not give enough detailed information. Decision-makers in
government will agree that improving policy credibility can improve performnance,  but
they will still ask what specifically they need to do to improve performance.
Accordingly, a third model is required to capture the relationship between performance
and particular elements of the institutional environment. This third model needs to be
disaggregated enough to provide input for reform interventions. Improving the
institutional environment as a method for improving performance is a practical strategy
only if we can assess which particular elements of the institutional environment really
matter. In other words, decision-makers are looking for reliable answers on the following
questions:
27*  Which  reform  efforts  are most likely  to succeed?
*  Will  the same intervention  be equally  effective  across  the whole  public sector  or even
within  the same  sorts of organizations?
To illustrate  by returning  to the analysis  of the Bolivian  public  sector,  in that context 11
components  of the institutional  environment  were identified:  six components  captured
rule credibility;  four referred  to policy  credibility;  and one  referred  to resource  adequacy
and predictability.
Rule  credibility  in the Bolivian  public  sector's  institutional  environment  comprises:
existence  of rules in recruitment,  existence  of rules in evaluation,  existence  of rules in
training,  existence  of rules in recording,  fair  treatrnent,  and  predictable  career  path.
Policy credibility  comprises  four  specific  aspects  of the institutional  environment,  i.e.,
policy  consistency,  policies  communicated  clearly  to employees,  policies  supported  by
officials,  political  interference/micro-management.  Just one question  examined  the
predictability  of resources. 52
Accordingly,  for the Bolivian  public  sector,  a third  model  was written  where performance
is a function  of eleven  different  components  of the institutional  environment.
Model  III
Performance  = h (Existence  rules in recruitment,  Existence  of rules in evaluation,
Existence  of rules in training,  Existence  of rules in recording,  Fair
treatment,  Predictable  career  path, Policy  consistency,  Policy
communication,  Policy support,  Political  interference/micro-
management,  Resource  predictability)
To unpack  the relationship  between  institutional  environment  and performance,  or in
other  words  to quantify  the relationship  between  performance  and  different  potential
reform  efforts,  an econometric  model  was utilized  to estimate  model  I .3  Its estimated
coefficients  were used to derive  appropriate  indicators.  For example,  to find  how  much
perfornance  changes  upon changing  the institutional  environment  via making policies
consistent,  the following  formula  was utilized:
Rate  of  performance  improvement  A performancelApolicy  consistency
polkyComillmy  performance,
52  In each country  where  BNPP  surveys  were administered,  survey  managers  customized  the survey
instrument  to country-specific  concerns,  stressing  some  areas  over  others.  As a result,  not all surveys
provided  questions  to capture  all  these aspects  of the institutional  environment  or of performance.
53  In a linear  model,  the estimated  coefficient  for a specific  aspect  of the institutional  environment
variable  is the partial  derivative  of the performance  with  respect  to that  aspect  of the institutional
environment.
28where,  AperformancelApolicy  consistency =  P  foa  , and apolicy  consistency
performanceo = initial performance level.
Stage 2 - Examine institutional rates of return
The illustrative equation below shows the percentage change in performance through
making policies consistent. In that sense, it is the rate of return on reform effort to make
policies consistent.  Therefore, it is called the institutional rate of return of policy
consistency (or policy consistency IRR):
IRpolicycDnsistency  A performance  /A policy consistency
performanceo
In general, a comparatively high-value IRR for any reform effort means that the
intervention is more likely to have a bigger impact on performance than another with
low-value.  A comparatively low value would indicate that the effort is less likely to have
impact and should not be taken up if considerable results are desired. IRRs can be
calculated for each of the eleven reform interventions listed above in the Bolivian
examnple.
A detailed econometric model specification, the estimation method, regression results,
and how the estimated coefficients were used in deriving IRRs for the Bolivian public
s.ector  (based on this formula which was described above) are all presented in Appendix
6.  Since all the input variables are capturing institutional environment, it is theoretically
possible that the input variables are correlated. For example, rule credibility could be
associated with resource predictability. However, two factors ensure that
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. First, as the model is offered as a heuristic
device for attracting policy-makers attention to particular points of entry to reform, this is
not a particular drawback provided that any correlation is positive.  If policy credibility
were to deteriorate as resource predictability improved, the resulting combined effect
would be hard to interpret. However, in all the survey results analyzed to date the
correlation where it exists has been positive.  Second, multicollinearity is a sample
phenomenon as well as a theoretical one. A good rule of thumb is to find variables that
are theoretically relevant (for meaningful interpretation) and that are also statistically non
multi-collinear (for meaningful inference). As the correlation matrix in Appendix 6
shows, the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables in the Bolivia data
are low. 54
The term "Institutional Rate of Return" has been coined deliberately to echo the more
common Internal Rate of Return. Its purpose is to draw attention to the heterogeneous
54  In  addition  to presenting  this  matrix,  Appendix  6 further  explains  how  survey  responses  were
converted  to a binary mode thus lowering  correlation  among  the explanatory  variables.
29results that are likely to be obtained from varying different elements of the institutional
environment. It should not however be taken to imply greater accuracy than is actually
possible at the present stage of development of this methodology.  Given the imprecision
of the measure, IRRs are used to rank order expected payoffs by type of intervention or
change in institutional arrangements or practices, rather than to predict exact performance
improvements.
Stage 3 - Identify anticipated performance pay offs
As noted, IRRs are intended to draw attention to the varying results that are anticipated
from different interventions, but given their probable imprecision it is the general
magnitude of the pay off rather than the exact value that is relevant for policy makers.
The following table presents the potential reform interventions to improve institutional
performance in the public sector of Bolivia.  Only those reform interventions where IRRs
were statistically significant for one-tailed test are identified.  (For details, see Appendix
6.)  Reform interventions with statistically significant IRRs are classified according to
whether they are likely to impact on one, two or three areas of performance.
30Table 2  Reform interventions and anticipated performance pay offs in the
Bolivian public sector'
Reform Intervention  Improvement in Performance
Number  Results  Accoun  Employee
of areas  focus  tability  Morale
affected
Strengthening the credibility of rules for
evaluation  3  V  /  V
Strengthening the credibility of rules for
record management  3  /  _/
Ensuring that staff support government
policy  3
Strengthening the credibility of rules for
training  2  /
Preventing political interference/micro-
management  2  /  /
Assuring staff that they are treated fairly
2  /  V/
Strengthening the credibility of rules for
recruitment  1  /
Making government policies consistent
1  ~~~~/
Figure 9 demonstrates how these anticipated payoffs accumulate to distinguish between
the degrees to which each reform intervention is expected to impact on performance.
55  See footnote 48.
31Figure  9.  Expected impact of reforms on components of performance in
Boliviae
Reform Interventions affectine three nerformance areas.
I  M results  focus  °accountability  *employee  morale
Reform  Intervention
ensuring  staff  support  for
government  policies
strengthening  credibility  of
niles for  record  managemnent
strengthening  credibility  of
rules  for  evaluation
0%  10%  20%  30%  40%
Percentage  increase  in present  level of performance
Reform Interventions affectins two performance areas.
assuring  staff  of  fair
preventing  political  I
Reform  Intervention  intervention/nmcro-  15%  12%
moanagement
stengLhening  credibility
of rules  for uaining
0%  10%  20%  30%
Percentage  increase  in present  level of performance
Reform Interventions affectine  one Derformance  area.
Reform  I
Intervention  strengthening  credibility  of
rules  for  recruitment
0%  3%  5%
Percentage  increase  in present  level of performance
56  The unit  of measurement  for the improvement  in the performance  due to a reform  intervention  is
the percentage  change  in the present  level of performance.  For details,  see Appendix  A6.4.
32Decision-makers  in government  having  limited  resources  to invest in public  sector  reform
will want to be in a position  to choose  interventions  that  will probably  result in better
performance.  The information  presented  in Table  2 and Figure 9 allows  them to
prioritize  among  possible  interventions.  Available  resources  can be concentrated  on those
interventions  that affect  all three or at least two  areas of performance.  Bolivian  decision-
makers  would  probably choose  to strengthen  rules in performance  evaluation  and  record
keeping and  work to ensure  that officials  are committed  to supporting  government
policies.
This same  analysis  can be performed  for a type of organization  (e.g. centralized
administrations  in Bolivia),  a particular  organization  (e.g.  the Ministry  of Finance  or a
particular  group of officials  such as consultants).  Appendix  6 presents  the findings  for
central  administrations  in Bolivia.
5'  For IRRs  of all types of organi7ations  and groups  of officials,  see forthcoming  Bolivia  country
report  by Yasuhiko  Matsuda  and the authors  of this paper.
338.  Summary
The public sector is a diverse environment in which to work.  Although there are some
general conclusions that can be drawn, staff perform better or worse in different agencies
for highly diverse reasons.  The Anna Karenina principle applies: "all well-performing
agencies are alike; there are so many preconditions for effective performance that every
dysfunctional agency is dysfunctional in its own way"."
To perform well, public officials need to be confident about the future - not to the point
of smugness, but certainly to the point that they can see the relationship between their
efforts and any eventual outcome. The institutional environment within which they are
working shapes these expectations.  If the rules are not credible, with little prospect of
enforcement, if they expect policies to be contradicted or resources to flow unpredictably,
then they cannot envision any relationship between their effort and public sector
performance. Rationally, there is little point in working purposefully as the results are so
uncertain.
This paper sets out an analytical framework that was used in designing a series of surveys
of the views of public officials concerning their institutional environment and in
analyzing the information that was generated. It describes how the survey results help to
map the strengths and weaknesses of a public sector, and offers an approach for
identifying potential pay-offs from reform interventions. Above all, the framework
emphasizes the heterogeneity of incentives and institutional arrangements within the
public sector - and the need for policy makers to have information that moves beyond
generalities and indicates what is most likely to work and where.
In building on the premise that public officials' actions - and hence the performance of
their organizations - depend upon the institutional environment in which they find
themselves, this framework avoids any simplistic anti-government positions, without
attempting a defensive justification for poor performance. Although there is every reason
to be concerned about poor performance and rent-seeking by some public officials, there
are as many reasons to be impressed by the selflessness and determination of others
working under conditions of extreme difficulty. This framework offers an approach for
understanding both good and bad performance and for presenting the results to policy
makers in a format that lead to more informed choices about reform interventions.
The methodology depended on use of indicators to measure both institutional
environment and performance, but the measures need to be interpreted with caution. As
in the design of any performance indicators, it is important to ask: who wants the
indicators, who uses them and why. The reliability and the usefulness of indicators
depend on the credibility of the information on which they were built, on the accuracy
and comprehensiveness of the data. Finally, indicators are not the ends, they are a means
for decision makers to raise questions and highlight issues for further discussion and
investigation in the light of local, country-specific knowledge.  Indicators are not precise
59  Tolstoy's original  words  were that "Happy  families  are all alike; every unhappy  family  is unhappy
in its own  way". Gary Reid  pointed  out the relevance  ofthe observation  for public  sector  performance.
34measures,  they do not provide  comprehensive  coverage  of all areas of an individual's  or
agency's  work, and  they can  not tell  the whole  story.
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40Appendices
Appendix 1:  Illustrative questions to probefor  dimensions of the institutional
environment9
The test applied in grouping these questions was that these questions capture expectations
of current or future constraints and incentives -and thus the degree to which officials are
discounting the future and management is maintaining its reputation in relation to:
1.  rule enforcement in relation to budget or personnel management;
2.  binding policy direction;
3.  adequacy and predictability of financial and personnel resources.
Rule Credibility
a. personnel management rules
Within an organization, different people are hired for different reasons. This survey is interested in learning about
general hiring trends. In your organization would you say that employees were hired more often for:
1.  good performance at entry
2.  test qualifications
3.  met job requirements
4.  personal connections
5.  political connections
6.  family status in community
7.  payment of gift to some
8.  public authorities
9.  knew a senior official
(Guyana)
Does your organization have a system where annual objectives/ targets that are measurable are agreed to between
emnployees  and supervisors at the beginning of every year? (yes/no)
(Guyana)
What is your assessment of the existing formal, written guidelines related to personnel mnanagement? Please tell us the
extent to which you agree with the following statements.  Answer on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 corresponds to 'strongly
disagree' and 4 corresponds to 'strongly agree'
1.  relatively simple to understand and implement
2.  relatively flexible, providing our organization with a lot of discretion in their implementation
3.  helpful for effective personnel management
(Macedonia)
Now, we will ask you a series of questions about all types of payments in addition to basic salary. Please answer for
each of the following types of payments.  This type of payment is distributed on the basis of
1.  Clear rules
2.  Rules that require/allow for some discretion
3.  Full discretion, not on the basis of any rules
(i) public transportation allowance
(ii) food  allowance
- (iii) holiday payment (K-15),
(iv) payment for  overtime work,
- (v) bonuses for innovation and rationalization,
(vi) membership in Boards  of Managers
(vii) other bonuses or premia
(Macedonia)
59  The questions themselves were developed by individual survey task managers  and they may have
drawn  from  several  different  sources  in preparing  them;  The  sources  are not  all known  and thus  exact
citations  can not be provided  for  each question.
41Are positions like yours generally advertised to the public? (yes/no)
(Bolivia)
In your organization, would you say that the employees are hired more often for:
1.  Performance on an examination
2.  Personal connections
3.  Political connections
4.  Famnily  relations
5.  Payment or gift to some public authorities
6.  Good CV
(Bolivia)
Does your organization have Individual Annual Operations Plans (POAI) for its employees? (yes/no)
(Bolivia)
Can an employee appeal a dismissal? (yes/no)
(Bolivia)
Does your organization have a Human Resource Management Infornation  System (HMIS)  containing records of
employees? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
As far as you know, does your organization have a stated performance appraisal system? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
Are the criteria for appraisal known to you? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
b. budget management rules
For each of the following aspects of budget mnanagement,  does your organization have formal, written guidelines
describing how these functions are to be canied out. If so, are they carried out in full, in part, or not at all? Please





0 production of fnal  end-of-year accounts
(Macedonia)
What is your assessment of the existing formal, written guidelines related to budget managernent?  Please tell us the
extent to which you agree with the following statements. Answer on a scale of I to 4, where I corresponds to 'strongly
disagree' and 4 corresponds to 'strongly agree'
*  relatively simple to understand
*  relatively flexible
*  helpful for effective and efficient planning of programs/activities
(Macedonia)
Are there rules in place, which govem security, movernent, and storage of financial records?
(Macedonia)
Does your organization have an intemal audit function? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
c. general rules
Are there rules in place, which govem security, movement, and storage of records?  (yes/no)
(Macedonia)
Is there a fornal  system of evaluating programs/ projects being implemented by your organization? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
Policy Credibility
Agencies receive instructions and policies from different parts of the government, some comnplement  each other, others
conflict.  Overall, how do you see the relationship between these various instructions/ policies?
I.  very consistent
2.  more consistent than inconsistent
423.  more inconsistent than consistent
4.  very inconsistent
(Guyana)
How are changes in policy usually conmmunicated  to you?
I.  Written correspondence
2.  Orally
3.  staff meetings
4.  management
5.  not at all
(Guyana)





4.  Not at all
(Guyana)
In your opinion, how would you rate the incidents of political interference that exists in your organization?
1.  very frequently
2.  frequently
3.  infrequently
4.  Almost never
(Guyana)
Do you believe your budget institution has a clear set of strategic objectives?  (yes/no)
(Note to interviewer  examnple  of a clear strategic objective might be: (a) for an agency regulating drug safety, to
facilitate the introduction of safe medicines within the domestic market; (b) for a ministry of education, to build a labor
force with the skills and adaptability required for a modern economy
(Macedonia)
What are the reasons for imperfect implementation of formal, written policies, guidelines and regulations related to
personnel management?
And among these potential reasons, what are the two most important reasons?
1.  the guidelines are overruled by other directives within our organization or from other government units
2.  contradictory among themselves
3.  guidelines are not known or disseminated
(Macedonia)
What are the reasons you believe account for imperfect implementation of formal, written guidelines related to budget
management?
And arong  these potential reasons, what are the two most imnportant  reasons?
1.  the guidelines are overruled by other directives within our organization or from other government units
2.  contradictory among themselves
3.  Guidelines are not known or disseminated
(Macedonia)
Agencies receive instructions and policies from different parts (of government), some of which are incompatible with
each other.  How compatible (consistent) are the instructions and policies which your agency receives with each other
1.  Very Consistent
2.  Consistent
3.  Inconsistent
4.  Very Inconsistent
(Bolivia)
In your view, which of these measures would contribute to improving the performance of your organization?
inter alia...
Protection from political interference
(Bolivia)
Which of these measures do you believe can be successfully implemented successfully in your organization?
inter alia
Protection from political interference
(Bolivia)
43How strongly do you agree with the following statement which is about the public administration in general not about
specifically your organization.
I =strongly disagree 4=strongly agree
[for Ministers/Deputy-Ministers only]
The process of formulating the national budget involves close consultation among members of the Cabinet.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The process of formulating the national budget involves close consultation between the Ministry of Finance and the
line ministries.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The process of formulating municipal budgets involving close consultation with the Ministry of Finance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
The process of formulating the organizational budgets involves close consultation between the budget managers and
department/division managers .
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Bolivia)
If decrees, executive orders, or policies interfere with the ability of your organization to do its-job, are methods
available to have them changed?
(Bolivia)
Political rnicro-management or interference by political leaders and ministers in day to day working of public sector
entities can sometimes hamper the efficiency of these organizations. In your organization, is the problem of political
micro-management
1.  Serious
2.  Present, but not serious
3.  Not present
4.  Helping your organization perform better
(East Caribbean States)
Before an election, does each party clearly outline in its election manifesto the national priorities it would pursue if
voted to power! (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
After a govenmment  is formed, to what extent are policies formulated within the previously announced priorities
I.  Most ofthe  time
2.  Some time
3.  A few time
4.  Very rarely
(East Caribbean States)
Resource Adequacy and Predictability
a. budget resources
Do you think that actual funds approved for next year's budget will exceed or fall short of budgeted requirements?
1.  exceed
2.  fall short
3.  other [specify]
(Guyana)
In what way do you expect that actual funds will differ from budgeted Funds?
I.  a large amount
2.  a moderate amount
3.  a small amount
4.  other
(Guyana)
Do you expect that actual funds for your organization will differ from budgeted funds this year? (yes/no)
(Macedonia)
Do you expect that actual funds will differ from budgeted funds by a large amount or a small amount?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1=a small amount;  4=a large amount
(Macedonia)
How typical, in your experience, is it for actual funds to differ from budgeted funds?  Would you say that it is rare, not
typical, fairly typical very typical?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1  =rare;  4=very typical
(Macedonia)
44To what extent does the public administration and your organization have adequate financial resources to provide an
appropriate level of service?  Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to 'completely inadequate' and 5
corresponds to 'completely adequate'.
Are the following resources in short supply for your organization? Please also identify the two resources in most short
supply.
Number of staff, skills of staff, computers, office supplies (excluding computers), other goods and services, mnanagerial
support, other (specify)
(Macedonia)
Here is a list of attributes which people mention for an organization to work efficiently.  If your organization lacks any
of them, write it down in your list, please.
inter alia...
Disbursement of budget resources without delay
(Bolivia)
b. personnel resources






Some people consider that emigration of educated and trained persons from the Caribbean to US, lUK and Canada
drains the public sector of skilled persons. How severe is this problem in your organization?





45Appendix 2:  Institutional environment indicators in the East Caribbean States 60
Statistical Table 1  Rule credibility indicator and components (East Caribbean)
Record  Internal  Performance  Project  Rule
management audit  appraisal  evaluation  Credibility
Antigua  and Barbuda  8.4  3.5  4.3  3.7  5.0
Grenada  8.8  3.6  9.3  6.1  6.9
St. Kitts and  Nevis  7.1  6.5  5.6  5.0  6.1
St. Lucia  8.6  5.5  8.1  4.1  6.6
St. Vincent  And Grenadines  8.9  6.9  4.2  5.1  6.3
East Caribbean  8.6  5.2  6.6  4.7  6.3
Statistical Table 2  Policy credibility indicator and components (East Caribbean)
Consistency  Policy  Micro-  Policy
coordination  management  Credibility
Antigua  and Barbuda  4.1  5.3  4.2  4.5
Grenada  3.7  5.4  3.8  4.3
St.Kitts andNevis  7.3  6.9  3.3  5.8
St. Lucia  6.0  6.4  3.5  5.3
St. Vincent  And Grenadines  4.2  5.1  3.8  4.4
East  Caribbean  4.8  5.7  3.7  4.8
Statistical Table 3  Indicator of resource adequacy and predictability and
components (East Caribbean)
Lost  man-days  skills  Institutional  Resource
from natural  available  capacity  adequacy  and
disasters  predictability
Antigua  and Barbuda  4.1  5.5  7.7  5.8
Grenada  3.9  7.4  7.9  6.4
St. Kitts and Nevis  5.3  5.9  7.4  6.2
St. Lucia  5.3  6.5  6.2  6.0
St. Vincent  And Grenadines  5.3  6.1  6.3  5.9
East  Caribbean  4.5  6.3  7.1  6.0
60  See footnote  48.
46Statistical  Table 4  Indicator  of overall institutional  environment  and components
(East Caribbean)
Rule  Policy  Resource  Overall
Credibility  Credibility  predictability  Institutional
from Statistical  from Statistical from Statistical Environment
Table I  Table  2  Table  3
Antigua  and Barbuda  5.0  4.5  5.8  5.1
Grenada  6.9  4.3  6.4  5.9
St.  Kitts and Nevis  6.1  5.8  6.2  6.0
St. Lucia  6.6  5.3  6.0  5.9
St. Vincent  And  Grenadimes  6.3  4.4  5.9  5.5
East Caribbean  6.3  4.8  6.0  5.7
47Appendix 3.  Illustrative questions to probefor  dimensions ofperformance6'
Test applied:
These question capture perceptions of past performance and of
1.  the degree to which a concern for results or outputs shaped behavior,
2.  rule-based behavior in relation to budget or personnel management;
3.  morale and job satisfaction.
Results Focus
Are there documented work / performance standards for each function in your organization? (yes/no)
Are they generally achieved?
(Guyana)
In your opinion, to what extent would you say that your organization has realized its mnission?
0 to 25%
26% to 50%
51%  to 75%
76%  to 100%
(Guyana)
In the past year have staff in your organization been rewarded for any of the following reasons?
1.  Taking prompt action on customers / Clients/ end users' requests or complaints
2.  Providing outstanding service
3.  Improving qualifications
4.  Excellent attendance record
5.  Consistent courtesy




4.  almost never
5.  never
(Guyana)
Across individuals within your budget institution, all types of bonuses and similar payments are
I.  very unequally distributed
2.  unequally distributed
3.  equally distributed
4.  distributed on the basis of performance
(Macedonia)
In the past year, has anyone in your organization been the subject of the following types of sanctions for poor
performance  or unprofessional conduct?
1.  Dismissal
2.  Demotion
3.  Salary decrease for a specified length of time
4.  Suspension of duties with withdrawal of salary
5.  Postponement of promotion or pay increases
6.  Public censure and reprimand
7.  Warning
8.  Initiating criminal proceedings
(Macedonia)
61  The questions themselves were developed by individual survey task managers and they may have
drawn  from several different  sources  in  preparing  them. The sources are not all known and  thus exact
citations  can not be provided  for each question.
48What were the causes of the disciplinary actions?
1.  Poor work performance
2.  Unauthorized absence
3.  Working on a second job during official work hours
4.  Soliciting or accepting bribe
5.  Embezzlement
6.  Conflict with supervisor
(Macedonia)
During the past two years, has your organization received any sanctions or measures for not performing well?
If yes, which of the following mneasures?
1.  Our budget was reduced
2.  Our budget was increased
3.  Responsible staff was disciplined
4.  We received a warning
5.  other (specify)
(Macedonia)
In the past year, have staff in your organization been recognized/rewarded for any of the following reasons?
1.  Taking prornpt action on consurer  requests or complaints
2.  Providing outstanding service
3.  Other
4.  No recognition/reward
(Bolivia)
How many employees of your organization with excellent performance have not received recognition/reward?
1.  Many
2.  Some
3.  A few
4.  No one has received recognition
(Bolivia)




4.  Almost never or never
(Bolivia)
At the end of the year, are physical outputs of your organization measured and evaluated against the expenditure
incurred?
1.  Most of the time
2.  Frequently
3.  A few tirnes
4.  Very rarely
(East Caribbean States)
In the past year, how mnany  ermployees in your organization received?
Reward or recognition for good performance?
*  0%
*  about 10%
*  about 25%
*  about 50%
Some kind of penalty for non-performance?
*  0%
*  about 10%
*  about 25%
*  about 50%
(East Caribbean States)
In your performance evaluation, how much importance is laid on your achievemnent  of your targets
I.  a lot
2.  some
3.  a little
4.  not at all
(East Caribbean States)
49Accountability
When you first joined the government, were you assured that you would get the job? (yes/no)
(Guyana)
Before you applied for your current job were you assured that you would get the job?  (yes/no)
(Guyana)
When was your performance last appraised by your supervisor?
I . last quarter
2.  mid year
3.  end of first quarter
4.  one year ago
5.  two years ago
6.  three years ago
7.  more than three years ago
8.  performance not appraised
(Guyana)
How difficult is it to obtain adequate and timely information from the records management system in your
organization?
[  very difficult  D difficult  D very easy D easy
(Guyana)
In your opinion, to what extent is corruption a significant problem in the public sector as a whole?
1.  very significant
2.  significant
3.  somewhat significant
4.  not significant at all
(Guyana)
How often are cases of corruption, generally, reported to the proper authorities?
1.  Almost always
2.  Frequently
3.  Occasionally
4.  Almost never
(Guyana)
In the past year, has anyone in your organization been the subject of the following types of sanctions for poor
performance or unprofessional conduct?
1.  Dismissal
2.  Demotion
3.  Salary decrease for a specified length of time
4.  Suspension of duties with withdrawal of salary
5.  Postponement of promotion or pay increases
6.  Public censure and reprimand
7.  Warning
8.  Initiating criminal proceedings
(Macedonia)
What were the causes of the disciplinary actions?
I . Poor work performance
2.  Unauthorized absence
3.  Working on a second job during official work hours
4.  Soliciting or accepting bribe
5.  Embezzlement
6.  Conflict with supervisor
(Macedonia)
For each of the following aspects of budget management, does your organization have formal, written guidelines
describing how these functions are to be carried out. If so, are they carried out in full, in part, or not at all? Please
answer on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 corresponds to "not at all" and 4 corresponds to "yes, in full".
(Macedonia)
Is there a problem of finding important financial records in your organization?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1  =extremely problematic 5==no  problem at all
(Macedonia)
50Please evaluate the following opposing statements about practice in monitoring commitments and mnanaging
aggregate expenditure.
In your organization, a system for monitoring and controlling the total stock of expenditure commrritments  incurred is
*  not present
*  present
*  present and moderately effective
*  present and highly effective
In your organization the total stock of expenditure commitments is monitored frequently throughout the year and
controls are in place to ensure that total commitments do not exceed total budget authorization
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)
(1) totally disagree  (4) totally agree
(Macedgnia)
How easy is it to find necessary records in your department? Please answer on a scale from 1 to 4, where 1
corresponds to "extremely difficulf' and 4 corresponds to "very easy".
(Macedonia)




4.  Almost never or never
(Bolivia)
Would you say that, in your organization, corruption is a
1.  very serious problem,
2.  a serious problem,
3.  a somewhat serious problem, or
4.  not a serious problem at all?
(Bolivia)
How difficult is to obtain information from those records?
1.  Very difficult
2.  Difficult
3.  Easy
4.  Very easy
(Bolivia)
How reliable is the information contained in your organization's HRMIS?
1.  Very reliable
2.  Reliable
3.  Not reliable
4.  Completely unreliable
(East Caribbean States)
Does your organization's HRMIS contain the following?
1  . Updated records of all training you attended
2.  The dates when you got increment or moved from one scale to another
3.  Perfornance  evaluation reports
4.  The date you will retire from service
(East Caribbean States)
When were your own records last updated on HRMIS?
1  . In 2000
2.  In 1999
3.  In 1998
4.  Do not know when the records were updated
(East Caribbean States)
How easy or difficult is to obtain for official purposes records of employees in your organization?
I . Very easy
2.  Easy
3.  Difficult
4.  Very difficult
(East Caribbean States)
51Have you ever met with associations / groups of citizens who are the users, consumers of the services produced by
your organization? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
Are you obliged to share official infonnation, especially that related to performance of your organization, with them?
(yes/no)
(East  Caribbean  States)
Is your organization's audit report required to be presented to parliament? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
If yes, how effective is the internal audit in ensuring compliance with internal control systems?
1.  Very effective.
2.  Effective.
3.  Partially effective.
4.  Ineffective
(East Caribbean States)
How long ago was your last appraisal conducted?
1.  Less than 6 months ago
2.  Less than a year ago
3.  More than a year ago
4.  I have never been appmised
(East Caribbean States)
Employee Morale 62
Is your salary sufficient to meet your living expenses? (yes/no)
(Guyana)





During periods of economic difficulty and austerity, some people talk about decreasing the size of the government as
a means of saving money. Decreasing the size of the government would, in sorne areas, entail organization
streamlining and staff cutbacks. Given that, how worried are you about losing your job sometime in the near future?
1.  Very Worried
2.  Somewhat Worried
3.  Not At All Worried
(Guyana)
How often do you receive salary or wages late?
1.  very often
2.  a few times
3.  sornetimes
4.  no time at all
(Guyana)
How worried are you about losing yourjob  some time in the near future?
1.  very worried
2.  somewhat worried
3.  not very worried
4.  not at all worried
(Macedonia)
In what year did you receive your last promotion?
When do you expect to be considered for your next promotion?
*  Don't  know
*  Don't  expect to be considered for promotion
(Macedonia)
Would you describe the quality of life that you have raintained  over the past year as unacceptable, acceptable, good
or excellent?
(Macedonia)
62  To further assess performance, a measure of vertical solitude  was also constructed  from  the
differences in perceptions conceming the environment between managers  and their  staff.
52Are your earnings from your job in the public administration (including base salary and other  payments) sufficient to
pay your living expenses? (yes/no)
(Bolivia)
How probable is it that in the near future you will become unemployed?
1.  Very probable
2.  Somewhat probable
3.  Not very probable
4.  Not at all probable
(Bolivia)
Do you feel that you are contributing to your organization's performance? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
Do you enjoy your work? (yes/no)
(East Caribbean States)
How probable is it that in the near future you will lose your job?
1.  Very likely
2.  Likely
3.  Unlikely
4.  Very unlikely
(East Caribbean States)
53Appendix 4:  Performance indicators in the East Caribbean States 63
Statistical Table 5  Results focus indicator and components (East Caribbean)
Geared to  Efficiency  merit based reward Results focus
organization's  & punishment
objectives
Antigua and Barbuda  6.0  3.6  0.7  3.6
Grenada  6.7  4.9  1.7  5.1
St. Kitts and Nevis  7.4  5.4  2.0  5.2
St. Lucia  6.9  4.1  1.3  5.0
St. Vincent And Grenadines  6.9  4.5  1.2  5.2
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
East Caribbean  6.8  4.4  1.3  4.9
Statistical Table 6  Accountability indicator and components (East Caribbean)
Enforcement  of regulations  in_  _  A ^  Accountability  to  Accounta
CD  0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~bility
18- ~  ~  ~  O  8  w  e~~~  from
g"  previous
'~~~ ~~  ~~8  columns
Antigua and  5.4  7.7  4.6  5.6  5.8  5.0  4.4  6.2  5.4
Barbuda
Grenada  4.7  8.1  6.0  7.4  6.5  4.5  4.6  7.3  5.7
St. Kitts and  6.1  9.2  7.4  5.7  7.1  5.9  4.6  7.3  6.2
Nevis
St. Lucia  5.1  7.9  5.5  6.5  6.3  5.9  4.4  7.2  5.9
St. Vincent  4.8  7.6  5.4  4.5  5.6  5.5  4.1  7.4  5.7
And
Grenadines
East Caribbean  5.1  8.0  5.7  6.1  6.2  5.3  4.4  6.2  5.5
Statistical Table 7  Employee morale indicator and components (East Caribbean)
Country  Employee morale
Antigua and Barbuda  8.0
Grenada  7.8
St. Kitts and Nevis  8.5
St. Lucia  7.6
St. Vincent And Grenadines  8.2
East Caribbean region  8.0
63  See footnote 48.
54Statistical  Table  8  Overall  performance  indicator  and components  (East
Caribbean)
Results-focus  Accountability  Employee  Morale
from Statistical from Statistical  from Statistical  Performance
Table 5  Table 6  Table 7
Antigua  and Barbuda  3.6  5.4  8.0  5.7
Grenada  5.1  5.7  7.8  6.2
St. Kitts  and Nevis  5.2  6.2  8.5  6.6
St. Lucia  5.0  5.9  7.6  6.2
St. Vincent  And Grenadines  5.2  5.7  8.2  6.4
East  Caribbean  4.9  5.5  8.0  6.1
No measure of vertical solitude was calculated in the East Caribbean. The very
considerable differences in the perceptions of managers prevented the establishment of
any single reference point against which other staff s perceptions could be tested.
However, in other country reports where indicators could be calculated at organizational
level, an indicator of vertical solitude was constructed.
55Appendix 5:  Connection between performance and institutional environment'
Figure  10.  Effect of institutional  environment  on results  focus in Bolivia
7
result focus  =0.54  19 IE + 0.7997
R
2 = 0.2853
6  ____________________  bW  king-regula ion
tax
5  ;c
]  +  ~~~~~~~~Santa  Cruz  central  bank
;l  jzglaria  a~~~~~cu  reform
4  __iinance  __tele  rn-regulation
*  road
*  agriculture
3  __Chuquisac  i
5  6  7  8  9
institutional  environment
64  See footnote  48.
56Figure  11.  Effect of institutional  environment  on accountability  in Bolivia
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57Figure 12.  Effect of institutional environment on employee morale in Bolivia
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58Appendix 6:  Econometric and analytical issues
This appendix has five sections.  Section A 6.1 presents the econometric models.  Section
A 6.2 discusses the data and estimation problems and describes how these problems were
tackled.  Section A 6.3 includes the estimation results for the entire Bolivian public
sector.  Section A 6.4 briefly explains the construction of the IRRs for Bolivia.  Section
A6.5 has the IRR tables for centralized organizations.
A 6.1. Econometric models
Econometric Model I:
Yij= a + b E  +ei,
where
Y = performance indicator, with j =  aggregate performance, accountability,
employee morale, and results focus;
IE - institutional environment; and
e = a well-behaved stochastic error term.
A linear functional form was chosen to keep the analysis simple.
This model was estimated by using data points from 16 Bolivian organizations. The




Yj = performance-j, with j = aggregate performance, accountability (ACC),
employee morale (MOR), and results-focus (RFO);
X k=  component-k of the institutional environment, with k=l,2,  ..., 11; and
uj= a classical error term.
In particular,
xl  = Existence of rules in recruitment
x2 = Existence of rules in evaluation
x3 = Existence of rules in training
x4 = Existence of rules in recording
x5 = Fair treatment
59x6 = Predictable career path
x7 = Policy consistency
x8 = Policy communication
x9 = Policy support
xlO = Political interference/micro-management
xl 1 = Resource predictability
A 6.2. Dealing with data and estimation problems: the example of Bolivia
Number ofobservations
Having 1  1 independent variables (and a constant term), and only 15 organizations, i.e.,
data points was a problem. In order to calculate IRRs for different organizations and
different groups of public officials, responses from each public official were utilized in
running regressions.  That basically gave (after some data cleaning) 690 observation
points for the entire Bolivia; and 240 for central administration, and so on.
Collinearity among independent variables
Rather than doing nothing or changing the functional form, explanatory variables were
transformed into binary responses: an indicator which is less than 5 out of 10 points were
converted into zero, otherwise into one.  This transformation also allowed the
interpretation of the estimated coefficients in a more sensible way.  Instead of referring
to increasing policy credibility by one or by a certain amount, it was possible to refer to
making policies credible. Similarly, instead of referring to two public officials who
believe that rules in place 72.4% or 39.8%, it is possible to refer to distinguish between
public officials who believe and don't believe respectively that rules are in place.
Correlation  coefficients  for the (converted)  institutional  environment  indicators  (Bolivia)
xl  x2  x3  x4  x5  x6  x7  x8  x9  xIO  xlI
xl  1.00
x2  0.13  1.00
x3  0.05  0.03  1.00
x4  0.09  0.05  0.05  1.00
x5  0.04  0.10  0.07  0.05  1.00
x6  0.21  0.08  0.09  0.12  0.20  1.00
x7  0.12  0.06  0.03  0.07  0.03  0.14  1.00
x8  -0.09  0.00  0.00  -0.03  0.01  -0.03  -0.02  1.00
x9  0.11  0.05  0.13  0.09  0.06  0.19  0.13  -0.04  1.00
xlO  0.31  0.10  0.08  0.12  0.14  0.47  0.09  -0.07  0.23  1.00
xl1  0.14  -0.01  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.10  0.13  -0.04  0.03  0.09  1.00
60Correlation among the error terms of different  performanice  regression equations
In the left hand side of Model III,  there are three specific performnance  indicators, namely
Results-focus (RF) Accountability (ACC), and Morale (MOR) as a function of eleven
different aspects of the institutional environment (iE). In other words, we are saying that
much of the systematic component of these three different performances will consist of
the same type of variation-variation  due to the aspects of the institutional environment.
But, it is also likely because of the matching across public officials that random
components of the performances will be related. Thus, some knowledge of the random
component of RF variations would give us some predictive insight into the random
component of ACC variations.  Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that the errors of
these three regression equations--RF= a(IE),  ACC= v(IE), MOR= c(IE)--may be
correlated across equations.  However, when the errors are correlated across the
equations, OLS results in biased variance estimates. Therefore, to improve efficiency,
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) approach was used in the
estimations. If the errors of the equations were not correlated, then SURE results and
OLS results became the same.
61A 6.3 SURE Estimation results for the Bolivian public sector
Estimates  for equation:  Results-focus  N=690
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  Error  z=b/s.e.  P[IZI_z]  Mean  of X
Xi  0.1843148  0.23181  0.795  0.42654  0.4725
X2  0.6025640  0.27018  2.230  0.02573  0.2072
X3  -0.7502945E-02  0.27814  -0.027  0.97848  0.1913
X4  0.5985908  0.27651  2.165  0.03040  0.8058
X5  0.3981092  0.22865  1.741  0.08165  0.6232
X6  -0.2858045  0.26078  -1.096  0.27309  0.6420
X7  -0.5335056E-01  0.31301  -0.170  0.86466  0.8536
X8  -0.1540673  0.31894  -0.483  0.62905  0.8667
X9  0.7550640  0.24320  3.105  0.00191  0.6870
X1o  0.5296796E-02  0.25926  0.020  0.98370  0.4130
X1i  -0.3912180E-01  0.26093  -0.150  0.88082  0.7681
Constant  3.411840  0.50980  6.692  0.00000
Model  test:  F[ 11,  678]  =  2.52,  Prob  value  =  0.00421
Estimates  for equation:  Accountability
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  Error  z=b/s.e.  P[IZI_z]  Mean  of X
Xi  0.3022615E-01  0.12985  0.233  0.81593  0.4725
X2  0.6108728  0.15134  4.036  0.00005  0.2072
X3  0.4409731  0.15580  2.830  0.00465  0.1913
X4  0.7030247  0.15489  4.539  0.00001  0.8058
X5  0.1116405  0.12808  0.872  0.38338  0.6232
X6  0.5904624  0.14607  4.042  0.00005  0.6420
X7  0.1345138  0.17533  0.767  0.44296  0.8536
X8  -0.2312646  0.17865  -1.294  0.19550  0.8667
X9  0.3926405  0.13623  2.882  0.00395  0.6870
X10  0.9710046  0.14522  6.686  0.00000  0.4130
X1i  0.1574662  0.14616  1.077  0.28133  0.7681
Constant  4.051039  0.28556  14.186  0.00000
Model  test:  F[ 11,  678]  =  22.58,  Prob  value  =  0.00000
Estimates  for equation:  Employee  Morale
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  Error  z=b/s.e.  P[|Z|_z]  Mean  of X
Xi  0.2087146  0.70065E-01  2.979  0.00289  0.4725
X2  0.3327698  0.81663E-01  4.075  0.00005  0.2072
X3  -0.6659126E-01  0.84071E-01  -0.792  0.42831  0.1913
X4  0.4759933  0.83577E-01  5.695  0.00000  0.8058
X5  1.095540  0.69109E-01  15.852  0.00000  0.6232
X6  0.4592120  0.78821E-01  5.826  0.00000  0.6420
X7  0.1867915  0.94608E-01  1.974  0.04834  0.8536
X8  -0.8713628E-01  0.96401E-01  -0.904  0.36605  0.8667
X9  0.4057072  0.73509E-01  5.519  0.00000  0.6870
X1o  0.1470672  0.78362E-01  1.877  0.06055  0.4130
X1i  0.2771287E-02  0.78869E-01  0.035  0.97197  0.7681
Constant  4.136974  0.15409  26.848  0.00000
Model  test:  F[ 11,  678]  54.36,  Prob  value  =  0.00000
62A 6.4 Constructing the IRR indicators
The following is a demonstration of how an IRR was constructed by using the estimated
coefficients-which  were reported in the previous section.
Based on the following formula, which was explained in section 7, particularly for policy
consistency, two pieces of informnation  were required to construct a specific IRR.
A performance / Apolicy  consistency
IRRpolicyconsistency  performance
For instance, to construct Results-focus IRRs
(1) we  need estimated partial derivatives of the results focus with respect to
particular potential reform interventions-i.e.,  the coefficient of the related
variable from Model III. Yet, for statistical significance of the constructed
IRR, only the estimated coefficients, which were statistically significant for
one-tailed test, were used in the construction of the indicators.
(2) we need the initial level of the results-focus indicator.
As the reported regression results show, four of the estimated coefficients were
statistically significant for one-tailed test. The initial level of the result focus-indicator
was 4.481. Thus, the IRRs were constructed as shown in the following table.
Statistical Table 9  Calculating the IRRs (Bolivia)
Institutional  8 (results  focus)
environmentk  (  Resultsfocuso  Results  focus-
a(institutional  environment,,)  IRRk
Rules  in evaluation  0.603  4.481  13.4%
Rules  inrecording  0.599  4.481  13.4%
Fair treatment  0.398  4.481  8.9%
Policy  support  0.755  4.481  16.9%
63A6.5 Reform interventions and improvements in performance: Bolivia's  Central
Administrations 65
Table 3  Reform Interventions and anticipated performance pay offs in
Bolivia Central Administrations
Reform Intervention  Improvement in Performance
Number  Results  Accoun  Employee
of areas  focus  tability  Morale
affected
Ensuring resource predictability
3  V  V
Ensuring that staff support government
policy  3  /  V/  V/
Strengthening the credibility of rules for
record management  3  /  /  /
Strengthening the credibility of rules for
evaluation  3  /  V
Preventing political interference/micro-
management  2  V/  V
Strengthening the credibility of rules for
training  1  V
Figure 13 then demonstrates how these anticipated payoffs accumulate to distinguish
between the degrees to which each reform intervention is expected to impact on
performance.
65  See  footnote  48.
64Figure 13.  Expected impact of reforms on different components of performance
in Bolivia Central Administrations'
Reform Interventions imyactin2 three performance areas.
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66  As explained above, the unit of measurement for the improvement in the performance due to a
reform intervention is the percentage change in the present level of performance.
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